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Foreword 
A group of eleven Ph.D. candidates from seven countries--Robin Cowan, An- 
drew Foster, Nedka Gateva, William Hodges, Arno Kitts, Eva Lelievre, Fernando 
Rajulton, Lucky Tedrow, Marc Tremblay, John Wilmoth, and Zeng Yi--worked togeth- 
e r  a t  IIASA from June 17 through September 6, 1985, in a seminar on population 
heterogeneity. The seminar w a s  led by the  two of us with the  help of Nathan Key- 
fitz, leader of the  Population Program, and Bradley Gambill, Dianne Goodwin, and 
Alan Bernstein, researchers  in the  Population Program, as well as the  occasional 
participation of guest scholars at IIASA, including Michael Stoto, Sergei Scherbov, 
Joel Cohen, Frans Willekens, Vladimir Crechuha. and G e e r t  Ridder. Susanne Stock, 
our secretary,  and Margaret Traber managed the seminar superbly. 
Each of the  eleven students in the  seminar succeeded in writing a repor t  on 
the research they had done. With only one exception, the  students evaluated the 
seminar as "very productive"; the  exception thought i t  w a s  "productive". The two 
of us agree: the  quality of the  research produced exceeded our  expectations and 
made the summer a thoroughly enjoyable experience. W e  were particularly 
pleased by the interest and sparkle displayed in our daily, hour-long colloquium, 
and by the  spirit  of cooperation all the participants. both students and more 
senior researchers,  displayed in generously sharing ideas and otherwise helping 
each other. 
Robin Cowan succeeded in producing two papers over the  course of the  sum- 
mer, the present paper on how cohort size affects total lifetime consumption being 
one of them. In i t ,  Cowan develops a model, cleverly contrived t o  shed Light on a 
darkly complex issue. 
Anatoli I. Yashin 
James W. Vaupel 
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Introduction 
A s  a member of the  baby boom, I would like t o  be  able t o  blame my poverty on 
the bad luck of having been born in a large cohort, r a the r  than or! pome inability I 
suffer in the money-making department. This excuse is only viable, though, if 
there  is a systematic relationship between cohort size and pe r  capita lifetime 
earnings. Arthur (1984) describes a world in which such a relationship does exist. 
A s  my large cohort t r ies  t o  move up through the  job hierarchy pyramid, there  will 
be  a job market squeeze, and unless people before us r e t i r e  early, many members 
of my cohort will find that  their  advancement is slower than otherwise might be ex- 
pected. My concern in this paper is  not with the  job market, however. It  is r a the r  
with the  relationship between cohort size and intergenerational transfers. Arthur 
and McNicoll (1978) showed that  in a regime of stable populations. under typical 
mortality and fertility schedules, the higher the growth rate, the lower the 
individual's welfare. Analysis of stable populations cannot capture the  baby boom 
phenomenon though as a baby boom is very much an example of a non-stable popu- 
lation. If there  is a systematic relationship between cohort size and pe r  capita in- 
come, one effect of phenomena like baby booms is to  crea te  inequalities in living 
standards between generations. Keyfitz (1985) t r ies  to devise ways in which t o  el- 
iminate inequalities arising from intergenerational transfers.  He discusses three  
transfer  mechanisms which equilibrate the quasi-interest rates which cohorts see 
as the return on the  money the  pay into social security. His method involves pro- 
jections of both birth and death rates. My interest is  more general than this 
though. I wish to ask the question 'What would be the  effect on the net transfers of 
a cohort if i t  were of a size different than i t  actually is?" A s  one might expect, the 
answer depends on the  nature  of the  t ransfer  mechanism, and I will discuss a case 
in which the  answer is, in fact.  "Nothing." In this case,  t h e r e  is  equity between the  
generations, but this  equity is  not the  focus of the  exercise.  
In this  paper  I will descr ibe a framework designed t o  answer cer ta in  questions 
about how cohort  size affects  total lifetime consumption. I will use a n  overlapping 
generations model in which intergenerational t ransfers  are t h e  mechanism through 
which changes in cohort  size affect  consumption levels. The model will seem r a t h e r  
contrived with respec t  to many economies, in tha t  t h e  state will intermediate all  
t ransfers .  This assumption is not crucial  to the  results,  as I will a rgue  later, but i t  
does facilitate discussion. 
A Welfare State 
Each individual born in this mythical economy has t h r e e  distinct stages of life. 
From bir th  to age  z -1 h e  leads t he  life of a child, producing nothing and being 
supported by his parents  who receive baby-bonus cheques from the  government 
which exactly offset ail child-rearing expenses. For  purposes of exposition, I will 
speak as if t he  child receives  these cheques directly. From age  z to age y -1 h e  
works and receives nothing f r o m  the  state except  tax bills. Over this time his pro- 
duction can be  described by a n  age-earnings profile which will be  called f ( ~ )  
where a  is his age. During this  period of life he  also pays taxes  which go solely to 
support those who are not in t h e  working s tage of life. A t  age y h e  r e t i r e s  and 
produces nothing. The government pays him a n  old age  pension on which he  lives 
until his dying day. The government has  only one role,  namely to collect t ransfer  
payments f r o m  those working and disperse t ransfer  receipts  to those not working. 
This i t  does costlessly, and operates  only under t h e  constraint t ha t  i t s  budget must 
b e  balanced at all times. 
I now introduce a cohort  in whose welfare w e  will be  interested. I t  i s  born at 
time zero, and is  of size L .  The cohort  born just before  i t  w a s  born at time -1 and 
is  of size L t he  cohort  born just a f t e r  i t  will be  born at time 1 and will be  of size 
L No one saves in this  economy, so in each period (i) of Its life a cohort  con- 
sumes e i ther  i ts  t r ans fe r  receipts ,  Ri or i ts  after-tax production, tha t  is, produc- 
tion less t ransfer  payments, Qi - P i .  W e  should note tha t  t h e  production of o u r  
cohort  in period i is  Qi = L . f  (i ). 
The total  lifetime consumption of our  cohort  can be  expressed a s  a sum: 
where o is t he  age a t  death (which equals time of death f o r  ou r  cohort). Since the  
time when the  cohor t  is receiving is distinct from the  time when i t  is producing and 
paying, w e  can divide i ts  consumption into distinct par ts :  
For simplicity, I will refer t o  t h e  time when i t  is receiving a s  A, and the  time when 
i t  is producing a s  A C  . So 
The government plays t h e  central  ro le  in determining the  magnitude of total  
t r ans fe r s  each period. Every period, i t  considers t he  total  number of people who 
a r e  receiving t ransfers  t ha t  period, L;, and the  aggregate  output of t he  period, 
TQi, t o  determine the  total  quantity tha t  should be t ransfer red ,  Tq. Clearly, the  
number of recipients must be  considered, since if i t  changes, the  value of 
t ransfers  necessary t o  support  them a t  a given level also changes, and in t he  same 
direction. There is nothing t o  say tha t  the  level of individual support  must be  
fixed, but I will assume it  bounded; below by subsistence, and above by some level 
of luxury. This is enough t o  make L; an argument. I will assume as well t ha t  i t  i s  a 
am, 
"nice" argument. That is t o  say tha t  - is  finite and continuous everywhere. 
a q  
Total output is considered by the government since i t  is t he  tax base.  The l a rge r  
t he  tax base, the  g rea t e r  the  quantity (though not necessarily t he  proportion) tha t  
can be  extracted.  Each period then, total  t ransfers  can be  written as 
mi = TT(TQ~ ,L;). 
Having determined total  t ransfers ,  the government must then decide t he  s h a r e  
of total  receipts  (payments) t ha t  each receiving (paying) cohort  is  t o  be  assigned. 
In making this assignment, i t  does not differentiate between people by age,  and ig- 
nores  o ther  potential differentiating character is t ics .  A s  a resul t ,  receipts  are 
distributed t o  a cohort  according t o  the  ra t io  of i t s  size t o  t he  total  number of re- 
cipients. So  when ou r  cohort  is receiving (during time A) in each period i i t  re- 
L 
ceives - x q. On the  o the r  hand, individuals paying can be  distinguished by the  
=I 
quanti t ies they produce.  The government uses th i s  information, and when o u r  
Qi 
cohor t  i s  paying (on A C )  i t  pays Pi = - x each  period,  where TQi is  t h e  ag- 
TQi 
g r e g a t e  production of t h e  economy at time i .  Now t h e  to ta l  consumption of o u r  
cohor t  can  b e  writ ten as 
or more explicitly, 
Dividing through by t h e  size of o u r  cohor t  L ,  we g e t  lifetime consumption p e r  
capi ta ,  
To find t h e  e f fec t  of c o h o r t  size on to ta l  lifetime consumption, simply di f ferent ia te  
with r e s p e c t  t o  L . 
After  simplifying (and noting t h a t  ?Ti = T T ( L ~ , T Q ~ ) ,  we g e t  
As expected,  c o h o r t  s ize  a f fec t s  consumption in both s t ages  of life, and in both 
cases t h e r e  are positive and negative effects .  The f i r s t  term r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  e f fec t  
of c o h o r t  size on t r a n s f e r  r ece ip t s .  When o u r  c o h o r t  i s  receiving,  t h e  positive ef-  
f e c t  may b e  seen  as a marginal ef fect :  Adding a person  r a i s e s  t h e  to ta l  quantity of 
t r a n s f e r s .  The negative e f fec t  i s  a n  a v e r a g e  effec'~: That t h e r e  i s  one  more person 
means t h a t  whatever t r a n s f e r  r e c e i p t s  are available are s p r e a d  among more peo- 
ple. Clearly, t h e  n e t  e f fec t  on  t r a n s f e r  r e c e i p t s  depends on how t h e  quantity of to- 
ta l  t ransfers  responds t o  changes in the  number of recipients.  If - is  a de- 
a ~ , t  
creasing function of L;, as seems likely t o  be  t he  case,  then t h e  effect on p e r  capi- 
ta t ransfer  receipts , -of  increasing the  cohort,  size is  negative. The second sum in 
C 
a(,) 
aL represen ts  t he  effect of cohort  size on t ransfer  payments. Here,  effects of 
population a r e  transmitted through the i r  effects on production. The positive ef- 
fec t  is  t he  average effect:  Individual payments a r e  smaller as t h e r e  are more peo- 
ple contributing t o  t he  t r ans fe r  fund. The negative effect can b e  seen a s  marginal: 
A l a rge r  cohort  means t ha t  i t s  production, and s o  total  production, will be  la rger .  
This will have a positive effect  on t he  size of total  t ransfers .  Here,  whether t he  
net effect is positive o r  negative depends on how total  t ransfers  responds t o  total  
output. 
The net resul t  of changing the  size of a cohort  is, in general,  indeterminate. 
There are some special  cases, however, where the  t r ans fe r  mechanism is  of a type 
f o r  which determinate resul ts  can be  obtained. 
In t h e  f i r s t  case, suppose tha t  in calculating t he  quantity of total  t ransfers ,  
t he  government maintains a fixed tax rate and pays no attention t o  t he  total  
number of recipients. Here  t ransfers  are always a fixed proportion, a ,  of total  
output, and so our  cohort ,  in each period when i t  i s  paying, pays 1 0 0 .  a percent  of 
i t s  production into t he  t r ans fe r  fund. This is  the  only qualification to the  general  
scheme described above. Here,  t he  receipts  in period i (on A) f o r  ou r  cohort  are 
L Ri = - ( a .  TQi).  On A t  production is  unchanged, and t h e  payments o u r  cohort  
L5 
makes are 
So f o r  ou r  cohort ,  total  lifetime consumption p e r  capita becomes 
C 1 
- = x a T Q i ~  + x f ( i ) ( l  - a )  . 
= id Li id' 
And, differentiating with respec t  to t h e  size of the  cohort  
n 
which is unambiguously negative. This resul t  corresponds with o u r  intuitions: If 
each individual contributes a fixed proportion of his income to  the  t ransfer  fund, 
then a l a rge  cohort ,  when receiving, cannot affect  the  size of the  fund, so  t he  same 
quantity is divided among more people. On the  o ther  hand, a f t e r  tax production is  
constant, so  p e r  capita consumption on A C  is  unchanged. Notice also tha t  under 
this scheme those receiving when the  l a rge r  cohort  is  receiving are hur t  by i t s  
size, but those receiving when the  large cohort  i s  producing gain by i t s  size. (For 
t he  cohorts  very near  in bir thdate  t o  our  cohort  t he  net effect will also be  nega- 
tive though less s o  than f o r  ou r  cohort.)  
The second case with an  unambiguous resul t  is  t he  situation in which the  
government guarantees a cer ta in  standard of living, call i t  8 ,  f o r  those receiving. 
In this case the  size of ou r  cohort  is  positively related t o  i ts  welfare. Here,  over  
time A ,  when i t  i s  receiving, our  cohort  receives  Ri = BL. On A C  production i s  un- 
Qi 
changed, but payments are Pi = - 
TQi 
x BL;. Total lifetime consumption p e r  capita 
can be written as 
Again, differentiating with respec t  t o  L yields 
C 
a ( y )  
-- 
- C  m i x  J (i )2 
aL t a l c  T Q ~  ' 
which is  positive. A l a rge r  cohort  means that  total  production r ises .  The number 
of recipients does not change, however, s o  each producer  is  required t o  pay less 
in o r d e r  t o  provide support  at the  prescr ibed level t o  those receiving. 
The final unambiguous case which I will descr ibe i s  one in which cohort  size 
has  no effect on lifetime consumption. Again, this case can be  described simply by 
specifying the  total  t ransfers  function. If w e  specify tha t  total  t ransfers  are cal- 
culated by = K X L; X TQi, where K is  a constant, then 
Likewise, 
From equation (1) (page 4), w e  see tha t  under this condition, cohor t  size has  no ef- 
fec t  on lifetime consumption. The major drawback of such a scheme, were i t  t o  be  
implemented in o u r  world, is tha t  the  pa t te rn  of consumption over  an  individual's 
lifetime is determined (apar t  from his age-earnings profile) by the  sizes of the  
cohorts  which are alive when he  is. This means tha t ,  at least  in principle, i t  is pos- 
sible fo r  someone to  spend p a r t  of his life in the lap of luxury, and p a r t  of i t  below 
subsistence. (That's all  r ight  I suppose, a s  long as they come in tha t  o rder . )  
Discussions and Extensions 
I s ta ted ea r l i e r  tha t  t he  la rge  ro le  which the  state plays in this  economy i s  not 
crucial  t o  the  resul ts  of t he  model. That t he  state play some ro le  is  important, but 
not tha t  i t  play the  all-encompassing ro le  described in t he  model. I claim tha t  the 
t ransfer  mechanism described h e r e  is not grotesquely different in effect from what 
w e  might observe in an  economy with less government intervention. This is  clearly 
s o  f o r  t ransfers  t o  t he  young, which a r e  generally paren t  t o  child t ransfers .  If a 
couple has  more children, they are surely going to  spend more in total  on t he i r  
children. If paren ts  find themselves with more income, again i t  seems very likely 
t h a t  they will spend more on the i r  children. One word of caution: The model 
descr ibes  a world in which the  production of the economy a s  a whole affects  the  
size of t ransfers .  I t  is possible t ha t  t h e  economy could ge t  r i che r  without paren ts  
of receiving children getting r i che r .  I would a rgue  as follows: Most economies pro- 
vide many services  out of general  t ax  revenues: public education; defense; t ran-  
sportation system subsidies and s o  on. If these services  a r e  used by the  non- 
producing p a r t  of the population, then they are a t ransfer .  The level of these ser- 
vices increases as t he  production of t h e  economy increases.  With r ega rd  t o  
t ransfers  t o  t h e  re t i red ,  fo r  any economy with an  old age  securi ty  program, t he  
model needs no additional explanation. But even so ,  i t  seems very  likely tha t  any 
intra-family t ransfers  t o  t h e  r e t i r ed  will be  a function both of t he  number of reci-  
pients (both paren ts  o r  only one) and the  income of those paying. 
There a r e  two obvious ways in which this  model can be extended. The f i r s t  has  
t o  do with the  na ture  of production in this economy. Until now w e  have assumed 
tha t  production is  l inear  in labour. That is, changing t h e  size of a cohort  does not 
change i ts  average  product,  j '(a>. However Finis Welch (1979) has  shown tha t  the  
age-earnings profile of t he  baby-boom generation is  lower than one would have ex- 
pected had tha t  generation not been s o  large,  and this resul t  can b e  easily incor- 
porated into the  model. The second extension is t o  the  results r a t h e r  than t o  t he  
model. The model can b e  used t o  answer the question 'What would be  the  effect on 
lifetime consumption of ou r  cohor t  if some o the r  cohor t  w e r e  of a size o t h e r  than 
it  actually is?" 
I will f i r s t  address  t he  case of non-linear production. The model changes only 
in tha t  cohor t  size is  now included as an argument in the  age-earnings profile. In 
o r d e r  t o  make the  problem t rac tab le ,  I will assume tha t  t he  size of a cohort  has  no 
effect on the  age-earnings profiles of o the r  cohorts.  Now J" ( a )  becomes J" (a  ,L ). 
aJ" I t  seems reasonable t o  expect  t ha t  -is  negative in sign. If w e  accept  diminishing 
aL 
marginal product,  then as cohor t  size increases,  average  product,  which is  one 
way tha t  J"(.) can  b e  viewed, must fall. P e r  capita lifetime consumption does not 
change from the  simple model, but  the  f i r s t  derivative has  added terms: 
A s  in t h e  simple model, t h e  sign is in general indeterminate, depending h e r e  not 
only on the  t r ans fe r  mechanism, but also on the  responsiveness of average product 
t o  changes in cohor t  size. Again, however, t h e r e  are special  cases in which the  
resul ts  are determinate. 
In t he  f i r s t  special case discussed in t he  simple model, total  t ransfers  were 
not affected by the  number of recipients,  but were a l inear  function of aggregate  
production. In this  case,  
Under this  t r ans fe r  mechanism, t he  derivative of lifetime consumption with r e spec t  
t o  cohort  size has  an  added t e r m  in t he  extended model: 
* 
--  
a TQi 
- C -- 
BL i d  L;2 
+ C % , - a ) .  
i d '  aL 
This resul t ,  as in t h e  simple model, is  unambiguously negative. If o u r  cohort  i s  
l a rge ,  the  fixed quantity of available t ransfers  is  divided among more people, s o  
the  cohort  is  hurt .  A s  well, during the  time when ou r  cohort  is producing, the i r  
average product, of which they each consume t h e  proportion (1 -a), i s  driven 
down. Under this t r ans fe r  mechanism then, t h e  negative effect of being born in a 
l a rge  cohort  is  more seve re  than it  i s  in t he  simple model. 
The second special  case specified tha t  total  t ransfers  w e r e  not affected by 
the  level of aggregate  production, but w e r e  a linear function of t h e  number of re- 
cipients: 
Under this t r ans fe r  scheme, cohort  size has  no effect on p e r  capi ta  t r ans fe r  
receipts ,  e i ther  in t he  simple model o r  in the  extended model. Cohort size does af- 
fect both p e r  capi ta  production and t ransfer  payments in t he  extended model how- 
ever .  Here t he  f i r s t  derivative is  
Noting tha t  (f(i .L) + L S )  i s  equal t o  the  derivative of aggregate  output with 
C 
ami a- 
respec t  t o  cohort  size, - 
aL , w e  see tha t  t he  sign of - i s  ambiguous. (It is safe aL 
t o  assume, I think, t ha t  aggregate  output r i ses  if t h e  size of a producing cohort  in- 
creases.)  A s  in t he  simple model, w e  have a positive effect--the second t e r m  
descr ibes  the  gain from having more producers  among whom t o  divide a fixed quan- 
t i ty of t ransfer  payments. This effect is smaller than in t h e  simple model, though, 
since average  product is  driven down by the  e x t r a  cohort  members. The f i r s t  t e r m  
represen ts  t he  p e r  capi ta  loss of after tax production due t o  t h e  growth of t h e  
cohort.  Under these conditions, t he  higher is  the  r a t i o  of total  t ransfers  t o  aggre- 
gate  production, t h e  l a r g e r  t h e  positive effect re la t ive t o  t he  negative effect. 
In t he  original model t h e r e  w a s  a very simple t r ans fe r  mechanism which would 
guarantee tha t  no cohort  gained o r  lost solely due t o  i t s  size, viz. setting total  
t ransfers  t o  TTi = K xLtf x TQi. Under this mechanism, at each s tage of a 
cohort ' s  life, whether receiving o r  paying, the  net  gain from changes in cohort  
size is  zero. Indeed, this  is  t r u e  at every period in i ts  life. In t h e  world where 
average  product is  a function of cohort  size, this can still be arranged without dif- 
ficulty f o r  t he  periods where t he  cohort  is  receiving ( i  € A ) .  Simply devise a 
t r a n s f e r  mechanism t h a t  i s  l inea r  in L;. Unfortunately i t  i s  more difficult f o r  t h e  
per iods  when t h e  c o h o r t  i s  producing and paying (i E A t ) .  The same approach  
would involve se t t ing t h e  summand of t h e  second te rm of equation (2) equal t o  zero:  
am, If w e  assume t h a t  -a TQc fa l ls  as TQ r i ses ,  and th i s  seems per fec t ly  reasonable ,  
then in o r d e r  f o r  th i s  equation t o  have a solution, t h e  n a t u r e  of production must b e  
af such t h a t  f (i .L) + L~ > 0. But w e  have observed t h a t  f (i .L) + L- i s  equal t o  a~ a~ 
t h e  der ivat ive  of aggrega te  output with r e s p e c t  t o  c o h o r t  size. If w e  can assume 
t h a t  t h e  marginal product  of labour  never  goes t o  ze ro ,  then  th i s  quantity i s  always 
positive, and t h e  equation is ,  in principle,  solvable, and s o  w e  can  find a t r a n s f e r  
scheme t h a t  i s  neu t ra l  t o  changes  in cohor t  size. 
I t u r n  now t o  t h e  question of o t h e r  cohor t  ef fects .  The model can b e  used t o  
examine t h e  e f fec t  on o u r  c o h o r t  of changes in size of o t h e r  cohor t s .  For  th is  ex- 
e r c i s e  I will retreat t o  t h e  simple model. Incorporating t h e  e f fec t  of cohor t  size on 
a v e r a g e  product  i s  not a problem, but i t  makes t h e  presenta t ion considerably less  
t r ansparen t .  The time of b i r th  of t h e  o t h e r  c o h o r t  will effectively divide t h e  life of 
o u r  cohor t  into s e v e r a l  s tages .  These s t ages  can  b e  charac te r ized  by t h e  activi- 
t i e s  of t h e  two cohor t s .  In e a c h  s tage  t h e  e f fec t  of t h e  size of t h e  o t h e r  cohor t  on 
o u r  cohor t  will t a k e  on a par t i cu la r  nature .  I give detailed examples of two dif- 
f e r e n t  times of b i r th  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  cohor t .  There  a r e ,  of course ,  many types  of 
C a- 
b i r t h  times, but f o r  each  type,  t h e  genera l  p rocedure  of determining - i s  t h e  6L 
same. 
Suppose w e  are in te res ted  in t h e  effect  on t h e  t r a n s f e r s  of o u r  c o h o r t  of a 
change in s ize  of t h e  cohor t  born s per iods  after ours .  These people are s per iods  
younger,  and t h e i r  cohor t  i s  of size L,. The life of o u r  cohor t  can  b e  divided into 
six s tages:  
1) when o u r  c o h o r t  i s  al ive but c o h o r t  C, i s  not--from period z e r o  t o  per iod 
2) when both cohor t s  are alive and both a r e  receiving--periods s t o  x -1; 
3) when ou r  cohort  is producing and C, is receiving--periods x to x +s -1; 
4) when both cohor t s  are producing--periods x +s to y -1; 
5) when ou r  cohort  is receiving and C, is  producing--periods y t o  y +s -1; 
6 )  when both cohor t s  are again receiving--periods y +s to w. 
Consequently, p e r  capi ta  lifetime consumption can be  divided into these six stages,  
as can t h e  effects of size of cohort  C,. If w e  t ake  this derivative w e  get: 
These stages only apply when s < x .  Clearly, if s = 0, s tages  3) and 5) disappear ,  
and w e  have t h e  original results.  Also if s is  small, t h e  c ros s  effects  will be  simi- 
lar to t h e  own-cohort effect ,  particularly if t h e  age-earnings profile is  relatively 
flat .  
A s  opposed to examining these  general  resul ts  in detail, i t  may be  more in- 
s t ruct ive t o  look at t h e  f i r s t  two special  cases. Recall t ha t  in t h e  f i r s t  case total  
t r ans fe r s  were a l inear  function of aggregate  output = aTQi. Under this 
C 
a r r ,  a r r ,  rr, a- 
t r ans fe r  mechanism -= 0 ,  and -=- , and so many terms in - disap- 
a ~ g  aTQi TQi aLs 
pear .  In s tages  1 ,  3 and 4 of t h e  l ife of ou r  cohort ,  the  size of cohort  Cs has  no ef- 
fec t  on consumption. So  w e  can write 
The f i r s t  and third sums are over  periods when both cohorts  are receiving. The 
middle sum is  over  periods when our  cohort  is  receiving but t he  o ther  is  produc- 
ing. Here,  an  added member of C, increases total  t r ans fe r s  by aJ ( i  - s )  each 
1 period, of which each  member of ou r  cohort  receives  -. This is  a positive effect;  
=S 
t he  o thers  are negative effects.  Clearly, exactly when C, is  born (i.e. t h e  size of 
s )  is  important in determining the  relative sizes of t he  positive and negative ef- 
fects .  A s  s approaches z, t h e  f i r s t  sum disappears,  t he  second sum gets  large,  and 
the  third sum gets  small, very  possibly disappearing (if z > o - y ). 
Let us now look at t he  o the r  t ransfer  mechanism, where 7'Ti = WS. In this 
case,  t he  size of cohort  C, has  no effect  on t he  consumption of ou r  cohort  in 
stages one, two, five and six. P e r  capita rece ip ts  are guaranteed, s o  effects on 
ou r  cohort  can only occur  when it  is producing. W e  can write 
Here,  when ou r  cohort  is producing and the  o the r  is  receiving, an  e x t r a  member 
P ( i  ) will r a i s e  total  t ransfers  by 6, of which each member of ou r  cohor t  must pay -. 
TQi 
When both cohorts  are producing, an ex t r a  member of t h e  o the r  cohort  will ra i se  
aggregate  output and so lower t he  proportion of t h e  total  which ou r  cohort  pro- 
duces, thus reducing i t s  payments. Again, t he  value of s is  crucial  in determining 
the  relat ive sizes of t he  positive and negative effects.  
All of the  above analysis has  assumed tha t  t he  o the r  cohor t  w a s  born before  
ours  s ta r ted  producing, i.e., s < z. This need not be  t he  case. Suppose, f o r  exam- 
ple, tha t  w e  are interested in t he  relation between the  number of children o u r  
cohort  has  and i ts  lifetime consumption. In this case t he  o ther  cohor t  will almost 
certainly be  born after our s  starts working. Suppose for simplicity that  in each 
family all  children are born in one, possibly multiple, birth.  
Under these conditions t h e  s tages  of life of o u r  cohor t  have different charac-  
ter is t ics .  I will number them 1' to 5'. 
1')  Our cohort  is  receiving and the  o the r  is  not yet alive--periods 0 t o  z -1. 
2') Our cohort  is  producing and the  o the r  is not yet alive--periods z t o  s -1. 
3') Our  cohort  is producing and the  o the r  is receiving--periods s t o  x +s -1. 
4') Both cohorts  a r e  producing--periods x +s t o  y -1. 
5')  O u r  cohort  is  receiving, and the  o the r  is  producing--periods y t o  a. 
In constructing these s tages  of life, I am thinking of t he  following 'typical' life 
plan. An individual begins t o  work a t  about age 20. Childbearing does not begin un- 
t i l  a f t e r  the  individual begins work and is  completed by age 40. The individual re- 
t i r e s  from the  labour force  a t  age 65, a f t e r  which h e  lives another  15-20 years .  
This, I think, is not an unreasonable approximation f o r  the  life plans of t he  aver-  
age North American, say. Under these circumstances, parents  and children will 
spend some of t he  same yea r s  m t h e  labour force  together ,  but will not both be  re- 
t i red  a t  t he  same time. Consequently, only during t h r e e  s tages  of i ts  life does t he  
number of children affect  ou r  cohort:  
With qualifications t o  cover  par t icular  t r ans fe r  mechanisms, having more children 
will h u r t  ou r  cohort ,  a s  t h e r e  a r e  more people f o r  i t  t o  support.  On the  o the r  
hand, when ou r  cohor t  is  r e t i r ed ,  t he re  a r e  more people t o  support  it,  which i s  
clearly a benefit. When both parents  and children a r e  working, t he  net  effect  will 
be  positive if total  t r ans fe r s  increase with total  product, but a t  a decreasing ra te .  
Once again, in general  t he  resul t  is  ambiguous, but specific t ransfer  mechanisms 
will generate  unambiguous results.  
Conclusions 
The main conclusion is  t ha t  t he  size of one's cohor t  can affect  t he  level of 
one's total  lifetime consumption through intergenerational t ransfers .  Whether this 
effect  is  positively o r  negatively related t o  cohort  size depends on the  specific 
t r ans fe r  mechanism employed however. And, indeed, t h e r e  is  a t  l eas t  one simple 
mechanism in which positive and negative effects  cancel each o ther ,  and s o  con- 
sumption is unrelated t o  cohort  size. 
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